On the 6th April 1994 President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, the interim government blamed the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RFP) and within hours the ‘orchestrated campaign of killing began.’[56] The Presidential Guard (PG) and the party militia killed 20,000 people in a week.[56] The PG trained party militia to kill and the Government distributed fire arms.[58] The massacres included the slaughter of 2,800 people in a Kibungo Church. [59] By the end of April the PG and militia began ‘cleaning up’ the surviving Tutsis.[60] In the 100 days of slaughter estimated death tolls include 80,000 (UN), 1 million (Rwandan Government) and nearly 2 million (2008 AERG estimate).[61] Up to 500,000 women were raped.[62] Approximately 2 million people fled their homes; central Rwanda had 500,000 displaced persons, 200,000 people sought refuge in RPF controlled areas, 250,000 fled to Tanzania, 8,500 to Zaire, 6,500-10,000 to Uganda and up to 47,000 to Burundi. [63] Refugee camp conditions were ‘atrocious’ and Hutu gangs continued to slaughter Tutsi’s in the camps. [64] In July RPF had gained control over a majority of the territory then declared a ceasefire and on the 19th the new Government of Unity was formed.[65]
Legal Option
Intervention with SC Authorisation
A peacekeeping force was present when the slaughter began; UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda) under a Chapter VI mandate.[66] Support for UNAMIR was conditional upon cooperation and implementation of the Arusha Accords.[67] On the 20th April (14 days into the slaughter) the SG considered the options available to UNAMIR.[68] An option articulated was a HI, recognising that;
‘the situation could only be changed by immediate and massive reinforcement of UNAMIR and a change in its mandate so that it would be equipped and authorised to coerce the opposing forces into cease fire.’ [69]
This would require a Chapter VII mandate. The SG recognised the repercussions in neighbouring countries would create regional instability,[70] suggesting satisfaction of Article 39. Rwanda’s UN representative and the President of Uganda urged for UNAMIR reinforcements.[71] Spain, New Zealand, Argentina and Czech Republic unsuccessfully proposed a resolution to mandate reinforcements.[72] SC authorisation was not a realistic prospect due to the position of the P5, notably the US and France. The new US Government Policy Presidential Directive 25 (PPD 25) restricted support for UN missions.[73] The PPD25 was generated from congressional hostility towards UN missions since the murder of 18 US soldiers in the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia in 1993.[74] Chapter VII missions could only be supported if they advanced national interests, if international inaction would have to be deemed ‘unacceptable’[75] and it had political support. [76] US policy showed ‘geopolitical indifference’ to Africa and no national interest was at stake.[77] The PDD 25 ‘deterred the UN Secretariat from advocating stronger measures.[78] France was Rwanda’s ‘closest ally, militarily, politically and diplomatically.’[79] When the anti-Tutsi violence increased the French expanded their support for the abusive government and supplied arms until 3 months into the genocide.[80] France wanted to maintain its diplomatic relations with Rwanda and was unlikely to support a multilateral intervention.
The SG proposed two further options; the withdrawal of the majority of UNAMIR personnel, but continuance of UNAMIR by 270 personnel or the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR.[81] The SG did not favour complete withdrawal, identifying the consequences; severe loss of life and repercussions in neighbouring countries. [82] These consequences should have also been given strong consideration in relation to majority withdrawal given the realities of what 270 personnel could realistically achieve.
Other Possible Legal Arguments
The Genocide Convention
Members of the international community were aware of Article 3 crimes being committed prior to April. The International Community received many ‘warnings,’ including reports of the Government arming and training the militia, radio broadcasts inciting Tutsi extermination and Senior Officials in the PG reported the planned massacre.[83] The acts were genocide within Article 2 because they were commitment with intention to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group and the killings violated Article 2(a) and the rapes violated Article 2(b). States had a legal and moral obligation to stop the genocide and the use of force was the only realistic option of immediately halting the acts, placing a moral obligation on the SC.
Unauthorised Intervention
A state or a coalition of states could have intervened by claiming the right of humanitarian intervention in customary law. This would have been be a controversial and uncertain legal argument but the state practice and opinion juris of the intervention on would have contributed to the creation of a customary right. States conducting the intervention could have possibly claimed implied SC authorisation, if the SC had determined the situation satisfied Article 39 and Article 41 measures were proving inadequate. A successful intervention requires immediate deployment of large troops; this was not realistic option because states with the capacity to intervene had little interest in contributing.
Response
The SG described the ‘widespread killings’ as having ‘political and ethnical dimensions.’[84] The Belgian contingents withdraw after the murder of ten peacekeepers, reducing force strength to 1,515,[85] then resolution 912 authorised the removal of UNAMIR except 270 personnel.[86] The SC were ‘appalled’ but emphasised the ‘crucial importance’ of the peace agreement.[87] The SG stressed measures had to be taken before a ceasefire was achieved and outlined UNAMIR II proposals; Chapter VI mandate authorising 5,500 troops, with no enforcement action but with the ability to take action against threats to populations.[88] The SG stressed the atrocious effects on innocent civilians could not be ignored.[89] Resolution 918 expanded UNAMIRs mandate and authorised 5,5000 troops.[90] Resolution 918 used the language of the Genocide Convention but failed to us the word of ‘genocide’ and determined the situation a ‘threat to peace and security.’[91] Two months after the genocide began; the SC finally recognised the situation as genocide in resolution 925.[92] The SG only received one offer of fully equipped troops (Ethiopia) and several conditional offers, the US offered fifty armoured personnel carriers and France offered to pay for 200 equipped Senegalese men.[93] Governments are expected to make unconditional offers of fully equipped troops but states possessing the capacity failed to offer.[94]
In June the SC welcomed the offer of establishing a ‘temporary operation under national command’ to secure the protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians and authorised Chapter VII action to take ‘all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives.’[95] Initially proposed as a multilateral force only the French intervened: Operation Turquoise,[96] it established a ‘humanitarian protection zone’ over one fifth on Rwandan territory, which was assumed by UNAMIR in August and UNAMIR reached full strength in October 1995.[97]
Outcome
The Independent Inquiry (Inquiry) was mandated to establish the role of the UN during the genocide.[98]
The UN failed to acknowledge and respond to the genocide.[99] ‘The SC has a particular responsibility, morally if not explicitly under the Convention, to react against a situation of genocide.’[100] The International Panel of Eminent Personalities (Panel), (created by the Organisation of the African Unity) found the UN took for granted that the killings were a ‘by-product of the war’ failing to understand that an outright genocide was occurring independently of the war.[101] The US had amble information about the genocide, with direct knowledge humanitarian organisations, for example HRW[102] but genocide was not admitted to prevent a subsequent obligation of intervening.’[103] The SG labelled the failure to intervene ‘tragic’ considering most UN members are party to the Genocide Convention.[104]The IC failed to contribute resources to UNAMIR; states lacked national interest and showed ‘double standards.’[105] The resources contributed to Operation Turquoise should have been contributed to UNAMIR. [106] Operation Turquoise was not a true humanitarian intervention because its ‘humanitarian motives’ were ‘highly suspect.’[107] The Panel found many members of the genocidaire regime, fled to the ‘humanitarian safe zone’ and French troops assisted their escape into Zaire.[108]
The Inquiry recommended the creation of an action plan for the prevention of genocide.[109] ‘Lessons from Rwanda and The UN and the Prevention of Genocide’ programme[110] was established by the GA in 2005. [111] The programme outlines a five point prevention plan; prevent armed conflict, protect civilians, end the culture of impunity, create early warning systems and ‘take swift actions including military force.’[112] The Inquiry concluded the UN ‘must be prepared to act to prevent acts of genocide or gross violations of human rights.’[113] In response to the Inquiry the SG outlined the UN’s commitment to ‘never again fail in protecting a civilian population from genocide or mass slaughter.’[114]
[56] Amnesty ‘Annual Report for Rwanda 1995’ <http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=1995&c=RWA> (last accessed 10/10/10)
There was no humanitarian intervention in Rwanda. The IC failed to recognise the situation as genocide; states party to the Convention had a legal obligation to prevent the genocide and the SC had at least a moral obligation to act. The IC should intervene to protect civilians from genocide and gross violations of human rights. The UN committed to never again fail to protect.
[58] Ibid
[59] Ibid p.4
[60] Ibid p.6
[61] Survivors Fund ‘Statistics on Rwanda’ <http://www.survivors-fund.org.uk/resources/history/statistics.php> (last accessed 12/11/10)
[62] Ibid
[63] HRW n.56 p.9
[64] Amnesty n.55
[65] Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda S/1999/1257 15 December 1999
[66] S/RES/872 5 October 1993 para.2-3
[67] S/RES/893 6 January 1995 para.3
[69] Ibid para.13
[70] Ibid
[71] Ibid para.14
[72] L.Melvern A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (Zed Books, London 2000) p.214
[73] The White House, Washington, May 3, 1994, no.20482, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-25 <http://www.fas.org/urp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-25.pdf> (last accessed 6/4/11)
[74] International Panel of Eminent Personalities ‘Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide’ (July 2000) para.12.33 <http://www.africa-union.org/official_documents/reports/Report_rowanda_genocide.pdf> (last accessed 12/12/10)
[75] PPD25 n.72 Annex I A,H
[76] Ibid Annex II E
[77] Panel n.73 para.12.32-12.33
[78] Ibid para.12.36
[79] Ibid para.12.4
[80] Ibid 12.26,12.28
[81] SG n.67 para.16,19
[82] Ibid para.19
[83] A.Deforges ‘Leave None to Tell the Story’ (1999) see Warnings <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/> (last accessed 1/11/10)
[84] SG n.67 para.2
[85] Ibid para5,7
[86] S/RES/912 21 April 1994 para.8
[87] Ibid para.10
[88] S/1994/565 13 March 1994 para.4,11,16,15
[89] Ibid para.31
[90] S/RES/918 17 May 1994 para.3-5
[91] Ibid
[92] S/RES/925 8 June 1994
[93] S/1994/728 20 June 1994 para.6
[94] Ibid para.10
[95] S/RES/929 22 June 1994 para.2,3
[96] Panel n.73 para.15.66
[97] UNAMIR ‘Historical Background’ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirFT.htm> (last accessed 6/5/11)
[98] Inquiry n.64 set up by the SG under the authority of S/RES/935 1 July 1994 para.1 p.4#
[99] Ibid p.35
[100] Ibid
[101] Panel n.73 para.15.12
[102] Ibid para.15.16
[103] Ibid para.15.17
[104] S/1994/924 3 August 1995 para.29
[105] Inquiry n.64 p.43-44
[106] Ibid p.49
[107] B,Jones ‘Intervention without Borders’: Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda’ 1990-94 Journal of International Studies Vol.24 (1995) No.2 pp.225 p.231
[108] Panel n.73 para.15.68
[109] Inquiry n.64 p.53
[110] Information and educational outreach programme run by the UN Department of Public Information <http://www.un.org/preventgenocide/rwanda/about.shtml > (last accessed 6/5/11)
[111] UNGA/RES/60/225 23 December 2005
[112] Prevention of Genocide n.109
[113] Inquiry n.64 p.53 emphasis added
[114] 16th Dec 1999 <http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sgsm_rwanda.htm> (last accessed 5/4/11) emphasis added
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